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Abstract
This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and produc-
tion regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance lib-
eralization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such re-
forms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three
stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover di-
rective in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed mat-
ter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based in-
terests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate
governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxi-
cally” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than
the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This
constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management account-
ability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer
two explanations for the paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the
historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a
high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position
was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the
late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial
control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in
which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier behandelt den Einfluss von Parteien auf die Verfasstheit von Produktions-
regimen. Warum steht die SPD für mehr Liberalisierung der Unternehmenskontrolle als
die CDU, obwohl man wegen der Verteilungswirkungen solcher Reformen eigentlich
das Gegenteil erwarten sollte? Die Argumentation gliedert sich in drei Schritte. Zunächst
wird anhand der Kampfabstimmung im Europaparlament über die Übernahmerichtlinie
im Juli 2001 gezeigt, dass diesem Konfliktfeld tatsächlich eine Links-Rechts-Dimension
zu Grunde liegt – neben einer zweiten, klassen- und parteienübergreifenden Konflikt-
linie, die zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten verläuft. In einem zweiten Schritt wird darge-
legt, dass sich SPD und CDU bei den entscheidenden Reformvorhaben der Unterneh-
menskontrolle in den Neunzigern in „paradoxer“ Weise gegenüberstanden: Während
sich die SPD liberalisierungsfreudig zeigte, beschützte die CDU die Institutionen des
rheinischen, organisierten Kapitalismus. Das gilt für die Debatten über Transparenz, die
Rechenschaftspflicht der Unternehmensleitungen gegenüber den Aufsichtsräten, das
deutsche Unternehmensnetzwerk, die Macht der Banken und die Übernahmeregulie-
rung. In einem dritten Schritt werden zwei Erklärungen für diese „paradoxe“ Konstella-
tion angeboten. Die erste Erklärung betrifft den Wandel linker Ideen. In der Weimarer
Republik hatten SPD und Gewerkschaftsbewegung ein positives Verhältnis zum organi-
sierten Kapitalismus. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in den vierziger und fünfziger Jah-
ren, wurde linkes Ideengut in neue Bahnen gelenkt. Die zweite Erklärung betrifft die Be-
deutung von Konflikten über Managerherrschaft. Für diesen Konflikttyp gilt, dass Ar-
beitnehmer und Minderheitsaktionäre implizite Koalitionen gegen das Management bil-
den und steigende Aktionärsmacht die Mitbestimmung stärkt.
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1 Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the discussion of the impact of political variables
on production regimes. An increasing part of the debate on national models of
capitalism concerns the impact of party politics on the organization of production
regimes and how this impact is mediated by such institutions as the electoral
system and other features of majoritarian versus consociational democracies. Two
different, but compatible and complementary ways of designing such research
can be distinguished. The first way is to focus on macro variables such as conso-
ciational democracy and the organizational features of production regimes as a
whole. For example, Gourevitch and Hawes (2002: 244–251) point out that most
organized economies are consociational democracies, which can be explained by
their tendency to include the interests of labor into politics and by the absence of
radical political shifts, which fits in with stable long-term relations between dif-
ferent stakeholder groups. An alternative way of connecting politics with pro-
duction regimes is to deconstruct the concept of organized economies and to test
the partisan hypothesis for different subsystems of production regimes, countries,
and points in history. Production regimes are conglomerates of quite different
features, such as the corporate governance sphere, industrial relations, competi-
tion policy, skill formation, and the welfare regime. It is an open question whether
or not parties and political institutions affect different subsystems in the same
way: obviously, leftist parties in government tend to favor more codetermination
rights for employees than conservative and liberal parties do, but there is no way
of concluding from this that leftists also favor a greater degree of organization for
the corporate governance sphere. In addition, the impact of parties may differ
from country to country, being dependent on different institutional settings and
historical experiences.
Both research strategies should be combined, as both are associated with different
advantages and problems: comparison and analysis of macro variables reveal
overall trends, but lack depth of sharpness, while case studies are detailed, but
lack the proof of whether the findings represent typical or exceptional cases.
However, the debate on national models of capitalism has identified paradig-
matic cases of production regimes, such as Germany and Japan as typical cases of
organized economies, and the USA and the United Kingdom as the most liberal
market economies. This paper focuses on Germany in the 1990s by combining
two lines of inquiry: corporate governance research and the “parties-do-matter
                                                  
I would like to thank Andreas Broscheid, Richard Deeg, Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Peter A.
Gourevitch, Torben Iversen, Gregory Jackson, Herbert Kitschelt, Simone Leiber, Andrew
Martin, Jean-Philippe Touffut, Wolfgang Streeck, and Rainer Zugehör for their helpful
hints and comments.
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approach.” I will show that the German Social Democrats opt for more corporate
governance liberalization than the Christian Democrats, which seems to violate
expectations based on partisan theory. In fact, in the field of the market for corpo-
rate governance, Social Democrats instead of Christian Democrats tend to be the
market-enforcing party. I will present two explanations for this paradoxical out-
come: the conversion of leftist ideas after the Second World War, and the impor-
tance of conflicts over managerial control in which both shareholders and em-
ployees oppose managers.
The internationalization of financial markets has put European production re-
gimes under pressure to liberalize. In the 1980s, European integration led to com-
petition-oriented reforms of national business locations (Cerny 1997). Beginning
in the mid-1990s, reforms were extended to the corporate governance spheres of
production systems, resulting in the reform of stock exchange organization, com-
pany supervision, disclosure practices, minority shareholder protection, regula-
tion of management compensation, and takeover regulation (McCann 2001; Cioffi
2002; Goyer 2002; Gregory 2000; Hansmann/Kraakman 2001; Hyytinen et al.
2002; Roe 2000, 2001).
However, little is known about how party interests affect such reforms. Political
science has pointed out that political parties have different socio-economic voter
clienteles, which affects party ideologies (Budge/Robertson 1987), preferred poli-
cies (Schmidt 2002) and, as a result, political outcomes (Alt 1985; Alvarez et al.
1991; Hibbs 1977, 1992; Hicks/Swank 1992; Wilensky 2002). Party differences are
most likely to emerge in policy issues with distinct distributional outcomes. As it
is a long way from party ideologies to economic outcomes (Imbeau et al. 2001;
Schmidt 1996), differences in party ideology are greater than differences in im-
plemented policies, which in turn are greater than differences in outcomes.1
Marked party differences have been described by welfare state research (Kwon/
Pontusson 2002; Wilensky 2002). By contrast, findings on party differences in
macroeconomic outcomes such as unemployment, inflation and growth seem to
be unstable and very sensitive with respect to the observed time period. The idea
that corporate governance arrangements are shaped by partisan politics was
chiefly described by Roe, who points out that “social democracies widen the
natural gap between managers and distant shareholders, and impede firms from
developing the tools that would close up the gap” (Roe 2000: 19). This, according
to Roe, leads to high degrees of ownership concentration and impedes the devel-
opment of markets for corporate control (see also Bebchuk/Roe 1999: 37; Gilson/
Roe 1999: 265).
                                                  
1 In addition to this, it is also a long way from economic outcomes to satisfying people.
That is why the most far-reaching “long-shot” hypothesis on party effects was clai-
med by Radcliff et al. (2000), who argue that people are happier when leftist parties
are in government.
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2 European Corporate Governance Reform and Party Behavior
Corporate governance deals with the regulation of power over corporations and
differs from country to country as well as over time. Different laws and cultures
provide owners of large share blocks, minority shareholders, managers, banks,
regional and state authorities, employees and trade unions with different degrees
of access to the control of company policy. The main differences have been identi-
fied between the Anglo-American style “shareholder-oriented” systems and
Continental European “stakeholder systems,” in which ownership structures are
more concentrated and banks, the state, works councils and trade unions limit the
power of shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000). However, as Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) have argued, the German, Japanese and US corporate governance systems
may differ with respect to mechanisms and distributional outcomes, but they are
functional equivalents in the sense that all three systems supervise managers ef-
fectively and have supported the economic success of the particular nation.
This paper sets out by focusing on takeover regulation. Institutions that regulate
takeover markets are strategically decisive characteristics of production regimes.
Hostile takeovers are governance mechanisms to force managers to act in a
shareholder-oriented way (Manne 1965). Agency theorists argue that share prices
will fall when managers lack shareholder orientation. Low share prices create in-
centives for takeovers, as the new owners may increase shareholder orientation,
raise profits and, as a consequence, boost share prices. The difference between
former and recent company price is the takeover premium. The greater the take-
over premium is, the greater is the likelihood of takeovers. Therefore, managers
who operate in corporate governance systems that permit hostile takeovers
should behave in a shareholder-oriented manner in order to prevent hostile take-
overs. Empirical studies have indicated that the effects of hostile takeovers are
more limited than economic theory would suggest (see, as an overview, Höpner/
Jackson 2001: 5–14). However, it is widely accepted that markets for hostile take-
overs are the main characteristics of “shareholder-oriented” systems of corporate
governance, while “stakeholder-oriented” systems lack hostile takeovers (de Jong
1997; Hall/Soskice 2001: 27–28; Streeck 2001). Consequently, the emergence of
markets for hostile takeovers in Europe is likely to push the “Rhenish” models of
capitalism in more market-driven, liberal directions (Hall/Soskice 2001: 61;
Höpner/Jackson 2001; Streeck 2001). The main matter of dispute in European
takeover regulation has been the extent to which it would promote or impede
hostile takeovers.
Why should there be an underlying left-right dimension to this disagreement?
First, the procedure for company decision-making is likely to change when hos-
tile takeovers occur. Where codetermination rights allow works councils and
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trade unions to discuss investment decisions, hostile takeovers might thwart the
results of negotiation, as hostile takeovers replaces the managements that have
been the former bargaining partners. In contrast to “normal” changes in company
strategies, hostile takeovers are exclusively decided by capital market participants
and cannot be codetermined. In addition, in the case of takeovers by foreign
companies, degrees of codetermination decrease as financial decisions are trans-
ferred to non-codetermined foreign holding companies.
Second, the rule of thumb that the design of economic institutions has distribu-
tional outcomes also holds true for the institutions that regulate takeovers. A cru-
cial insight of the literature on different models of capitalism is that they tend to
distribute welfare in dissimilar ways (Hall/Soskice 2001: 21). De Jong (1997) has
pointed out that the distribution of the net value added of firms among share-
holders, employees, the state, banks and retained earnings varies with respect to
the likelihood of hostile takeovers. In systems that include hostile takeovers as
governance mechanisms, firms distribute more value added to shareholders,
while the percentages of value added that employees receive as wages, as well as
retained earnings, are relatively low. Conversely, in systems that are character-
ized by the absence of hostile takeovers, ratios of wages and retained earnings
tend to be higher. The mechanism behind this distributional pattern is the conflict
of goals between company growth and profitability growth. Continental Euro-
pean companies have more scope to invest in company growth even if these in-
vestments do not increase profitability. As a consequence, German corporations
tend to be bigger, but less profitable and less valued by capital market partici-
pants compared to UK companies. This is in the interest of managers and em-
ployees, but thwarts the interests of shareholders, who would gain an extra profit
if “their” companies switched from the “high growth – low valuation” equilib-
rium to a “low growth – high valuation” point (Höpner/Jackson 2001: 12–14; de
Jong 1997). Beyer and Hassel (2002) have shown that this mechanism changed the
distribution of net value added in shareholder-oriented German companies in the
1990s. Further evidence comes from the “breach of trust” literature (Shleifer/
Summers 1988; Deakin et al. 2002), which shows that shareholders’ gains from
hostile takeovers tend to result not from increased efficiency, but from the breach
of implicit contracts with employees. To sum up, company governance by take-
over markets might undermine distributional compromises to the disadvantage
of employees.
The third reason why the argument over takeover regulation and corporate gov-
ernance regulation as a whole should be affected by the ideological left-right di-
mension is rather theoretical. In the debate on different national models of capi-
talism, political economists have highlighted the existence of institutional com-
plementarity between different spheres of production regimes, such as the corpo-
rate governance sphere, the industrial relations sphere, the education and train-
Höpner: European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox 9
ing system, and even the welfare state. The idea is that these institutions are in a
balanced relationship to each other, which should make major changes in only
one of these spheres unlikely, although radical shifts in one sphere ought to affect
institutional stability in other spheres also. There is no consensus among political
economists on the extent and the strength of such complementarity, and some
scholars find hybridizations between elements of liberal and organized market
economies more conceivable than others.
The extent of complementarity between different spheres of production regimes
is the latest point of contention in the models of capitalism debate. But, in the end,
all scholars seem to agree that there are interferences between institutions that
govern the economy, and also, to some extent, that there are elective affinities that
make some combinations of institutions more likely and coherent than others
(Amable 2000; Aoki 2001; Boyer 1998; Hall/Soskice 2001; Jackson 2001; Streeck
1991; Whitley 1999). Since centralized wage bargaining, codetermination, trade
union participation, and a welfare regime that protects employees against the loss
of specific investments are seen as integral parts of organized market economies
(Gourevitch 2002; Hall/Soskice 2001: 24–25; Iversen/Soskice 2001) – and since
these institutions represent typical goals of leftist movements and parties – there
should be general support among leftist parties for the main institutions of or-
ganized market economies.2 This should include an aversion to markets for hos-
tile takeovers, which are a characteristic feature of shareholder-oriented, liberal
market economies (see also Roe 2001).
These three considerations lead to the main subject matter of this paper, which is
the expectation that leftist parties, including the left parties of the center, should favor
market-restricting corporate governance institutions that are associated with organized
corporate governance regimes and, in particular, that they should oppose regulations that
promote hostile takeovers. Conversely, rightist and liberal parties should favor in-
stitutions that enhance the role of capital markets in company monitoring and
should opt in the main for the introduction of markets for hostile takeovers.
2.1 The Battle Over the Takeover Directive
The aim of this section is to develop an initial indication of how European parties
and corporate regulation interact as a whole. I will test the partisan hypothesis on
a macro level by comparing the behavior of 75 different European parties. This
will allow localization of the attitude of German parties, described in detail in the
subsequent sections, on a broader landscape.
                                                  
2 For a general discussion on the interaction of parties and the characteristics of pro-
ductions systems such as skill formation, see Gourevitch (2002: 25–29).
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I use the crucial vote over the conciliation compromise on the European Commis-
sion’s takeover directive that took place on 4 July 2001 in the European Parlia-
ment as a test case for the behavior of European parties toward corporate govern-
ance liberalization. Until the 1980s, hostile bids in most continental European
countries were so rare that no special regulation was seen as being necessary.
Mergers and acquisitions activity was low, and acquisitions were based on nego-
tiations and not on hostile bids (Bergloef/Burkart 2002). In the late 1980s and
1990s, European mergers and acquisitions activity increased remarkably, and
some of these acquisitions were hostile takeovers. It was the spectacular Vodafone-
Mannesmann takeover battle in particular that brought takeover regulation, a
long-since disputed matter of European integration, back on the agenda. The di-
rective, which was twelve years in the making – the first proposal was presented
in 1989 –, was part of the Commission’s goal to create a common European capi-
tal market. The European Council of Ministers developed a common position on
the basis of the 1999 Action Plan for Financial Services. The European Parliament
amended the common position in June 2000, and a joint text was agreed by a
Conciliation Committee in June of 2001.
The directive would have created a common European framework for takeovers
and would have resulted in a liberal body of rules conducive to hostile takeovers. The
sticking point was article nine of the proposed directive. This stipulated that, in
the case of hostile takeover bids, shareholders needed to approve in advance any
defensive measures taken by the target company. The only exception allowed
would be the case of a company attempting to find an alternative bidder, the so-
called “white knight.” The opponents claimed that this framework was too liberal
and would leave European companies unprotected against hostile bids from
“Wall Street sharks.” In opposition to the Commission’s attitude, critics wanted
to allow the boards of target companies to take defensive action if they had
sought shareholders’ authorization no earlier than 18 months before the period of
acceptance of the bid, which, of course, would have adjusted the balance of
power in favor of target companies and to the disadvantage of hostile bidders.
The main opponent against the Council’s position was the German government,
and 99 percent of the German MEPs voted against the directive.3
The Commission proposal needed an absolute majority of the votes cast in par-
liament. On July 4, the parliament rejected the Conciliation compromise on the
Commission’s proposed directive in a tie vote, in which 273 members of the
European Parliament voted for the compromise and 273 voted against it. Sup-
porters of the compromise claimed that the voting behavior of MEPs damaged
                                                  
3 One German PPE-DE member supported the directive. German Social Democrats
and Greens voted uniformly against it. German Liberals failed to achieve the 5 per-
cent vote in the 1999 elections.
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the credibility of the parliament, and that this was a setback for the common goal
to create a single European market. However, as far political economy research is
concerned, the July 4 incident is a godsend, as it is perfectly suited to use as an
empirical test case for the partisan hypothesis, for several reasons. First, every
relevant European party in every European member state had to form an opinion
on this corporate governance liberalization issue. Second, the point of reference –
the Conciliation compromise – was the same for every party in each member
state. Third, all MEPs had to vote simultaneously, which keeps the time factor
constant. And, fourth, every European party knew that the voting result would
be extremely close, so everyone was aware that the behavior of their own Euro-
pean parliamentary subgroup might be decisive in the end. There was no scope
for symbolic voting behavior. In fact, the killing of the European takeover direc-
tive seems to have been the most relevant decision the European Parliament has
ever made, with the exception of the refusal to exculpate the European Commis-
sion in December 1998, which led to the resignation of the whole Commission in
March 1999. The crucial point here is not that the directive was rejected, but that
the voting argument allows us to identify the main dimensions that made na-
tional parties in Europe decide either for or against the directive.
2.2 Dependent and Independent Variables4
In 2001, the 626 members of the 5th European Parliament elected in 1999 were
delegated from 15 member states and belonged to eight political groups:
– the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and Euro-
pean Democrats (PPE-DE),
– the Group of the Party of European Socialists (PSE),
– the Group of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reformist Party (ELDR),
– the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/
NGL),
– the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Verts/ALE),
– the Union for the Europe of the Nations Group (UEN),
– the Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) and
– the Technical Group of Independent Members (TDI).
By crossing national affiliation and political group affiliation, I divided the Euro-
pean Parliament into 75 subgroups. The percentage of MEPs of each subgroup –
Danish Conservatives, British Labor Party members, Swedish Greens and so on –
that agreed with the takeover directive is the dependent variable. Therefore, the de-
                                                  
4 For data sources, see Appendix.
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pendent variable varies from 0 (for example, German Social Democrats) to 100 (for
example, Spanish Liberals).5
The main independent variable is the ideological affiliation of the subgroups. As the
hypothesis to be tested is that there is an underlying left-right dimension to the
range of corporate governance reforms, the subgroups had to be sorted into left-
right categories. An obvious problem is to find an adequate position for the Lib-
eral parties that tend to be left of center in questions of human rights, but right of
center in the issue of the extent to which free markets should be modified by non-
market institutions. Hearl’s analysis (1988: 444–445) of 1000 party manifestos and
party documents from 14 countries demonstrates that Liberal parties have a
“right-of-center bias indicated by the liberals’ rather higher than average placings
on such issues as free enterprise, incentives, economic orthodoxy” (about which
see also Iversen/Soskice 2002: 10). As the dispute over the market for hostile
takeovers fits exactly into this dimension, Liberal parties should tend to agree
more with the takeover directive than the parties of the center. Therefore, by us-
ing a simple ordinal measure and by referring to the five main party families that
Kitschelt (2003) distinguishes, the parties were indexed as follows: Leftist and
Green Parties (GUE/NGL and Verts/ALE): 1, Socialists and Social Democrats
(PSE): 2, Christian Democrat and Conservative Parties (PPE-DE): 3, Liberals
(ELDR): 4, Rightist Parties6 (UEN): 5.7
I included several controls. The most important control variable represents na-
tional, party cohesive interests. It is obvious that some countries would profit
more, while others would suffer more, from a free market for hostile takeovers.
                                                  
5 For help in the construction of this variable, I would like to thank Simone Leiber
from the Max Planck Institute in Cologne.
6 Similar to the Liberals, it is not self-evident that rightist parties are really on the far
right in economic issues, as German rightist parties have experimented with a com-
bination of far-right positions on the liberal versus authoritarian axis, but interventi-
onist and redistributive positions on the socio-economic axis. But, as Kitschelt
(1995: 66) points out, this is an exception to the rule, and “the rightist parties in all
countries but Germany are the most radically procapitalist in their own party sys-
tem” (see also Betz 1994: 109–119).
7 The Technical Group of Independent Members (TDI) was not indexed in the ideolo-
gical affiliation variable as this group was simply set up to profit from the status of a
parliamentary faction, which was exactly the reason why the European Court deci-
ded to disintegrate the group. The Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversi-
ties (EDD), consisting of members from Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the
UK, is a borderline case. Their ideological characteristic is anti-Europeanism, which
should be assessed as being right from center. It was decided not to index them in the
left-right dimension. However, it should be noted that an inclusion of this group
would have supported the tested hypothesis, as most of the EDD members agreed
with the takeover directive.
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As corporate governance systems and capital market arrangements differ from
country to country, companies in some countries are more likely to be the targets
of hostile takeover attempts than others. Where economic institutions promote
capital market orientation, companies tend to be higher valued by capital market
participants, which – in the cases of shares used as takeover currencies – makes
them stronger in takeover battles. In addition, companies tend to have better ac-
cess to risk capital for speculative takeovers where capital markets are highly de-
veloped. Conversely, companies in the context of corporate governance systems
that promote company growth more than profitability growth should tend to be
cheaper for raiders, and the potential takeover premium should be higher. As a
measure of these differences, I use the La Porta et al. index on Shareholders’ Rights
that indicates the extent to which a corporate governance system is designed to
benefit capital market participants’ interests. This index has six ranks and ranges
from 0 (Belgium) to 5 (UK).
A further control should accommodate the fact that every parliament is charac-
terized by its own voting characteristics, which may have some systematic influ-
ence on the observed data and may not wash out in the regression. Hix
(2001: 673) has pointed out that such a dynamic is the “government-opposition” dy-
namic. As parties that belong to the governments of the European member states
have had more chance to gain influence in the European Council compared to
national oppositions, there may have been a tendency for national opposition
parties to oppose the takeover directive more than parties in government. The
government-opposition variable is binary coded (1=party is in national govern-
ment, 0=party is member of home country’s opposition). A second conflict that is
typical for the European level is the conflict between large and small member
states, in which small member states claim to be excluded by the large states
when main reforms are informally prepared. Therefore, country size, measured
by the number of residents, was included.
Nation-specific attitudes toward takeover regulation may also be influenced by
national economic business activity, as expanding corporations may be more in-
terested in a takeover-facilitating framework than companies in stagnation. In or-
der to control for this possibility, national GDP growth in the half decade before the
vote of the European Parliament was calculated. This control varies from 9.01 per-
cent (Germany) to 41.01 percent for the Irish economy, which was expanding
enormously in the 1990s.
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2.3 Results of Analysis
Table 1 shows the results of three OLS regression equations,8 using the voting be-
havior of MEPs as dependent variables and both ideological affiliation of Euro-
pean Parliament subgroups and different combinations of controls as independ-
ent variables. The equations indicate a strong influence of ideological affiliation in the
predicted direction. In each of the three equations, the ideological affiliation vari-
able is significant at the 0.01 level. The non-standardized regression coefficients
can be interpreted as percentage point differences. Assuming constant ideological
differences between the five distinguished ideological blocks, a change from one
block to the next block on the right is associated with an approx. 23 percent in-
crease of subgroup members in agreement with the takeover directive. The incor-
poration of controls does not affect the magnitude and significance of this effect.
                                                  
8 As the dependent variable varies between 0 and 100 – similar to unemployment rates
or ratios of public expenditure, which can by definition never be lower than 0 or lar-
ger then 100 – an alternative to OLS regression would have been a logistic regression.
However, I argue that the strength of the results indicate that the replacement of the
OLS method with logistic regression would not alter the results. I thank Andreas
Broscheid for drawing my attention to this problem.
Table 1 Determinants of Voting Behaviora
Variable Prediction Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
Constant −26.523
(11.825)
−19.846
(16.965)
−18.224
(17.380)
Ideological affiliation + 22.920***
(3.295)
22.529***
(3.361)
22.739***
(3.439)
La Porta et al. index + 9.082***
(3.257)
11.748***
(4.172)
–
Party in national government + 9.766
(9.024)
4.671
(9.047)
Country size 2001 + −0.169
(0.203)
0.033
(0.195)
GDP growth 1995–2001 + −0.657
(0.793)
0.685
(0.648)
N 75 75 75
R2 (adj.) 0.474 0.464 0.403
OLS Regression Results with standard errors in parentheses. Missing values: see definitions and sources of
variables; variables excluded pair-wise. *** p<0.01. Software: SPSS.
a Dependent variable: Percentages of subgroup members that voted in agreement with the takeover direc-
tive.
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However, these results suggest greater explanatory power for the ideological affiliation
variable than they actually have. Figure 1 shows that the strong relationship be-
tween ideological affiliation and voting behavior (r=.95***, six party families) is
exclusively driven by leftist, green, liberal and rightist parties. These groups be-
have as predicted. In contrast to this, the prediction that there should be differ-
ences in voting behavior between Social Democrats and Conservative or Chris-
tian Democrat parties does not hold true. 49.4 percent of PSE members and 44.8
percent of PPE-DE members agreed with the takeover directive. Furthermore, in
13 out of 15 national cases, the majorities of Socialist and Christian Democrat/
Conservative subgroup members voted together. The data show that there
actually is a left-right dimension to the investigated corporate governance liber-
alization issue. But, as 65 percent of all MEPs belong to either the PSE or the PPE-
DE groups, the voting behavior of a large part of MEPs was affected by other
considerations.
For Social Democrats, Conservatives and Christian Democrats, national interests
mattered more than differences in ideological affiliation. Table 1 shows that the
La Porta et al. index on the development of national financial markets has a
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strong and significant influence on the agreement with the 2001 takeover direc-
tive. According to equations 1 and 3, every one-step increase in the six-ranked in-
dex results in a 12 percent increase in agreement with the suggested liberal take-
over regulation. Figure 2 shows that the financial market orientation of corporate
governance institutions explains the voting behavior of center party members to a
large extent. In Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Austria,
where the magnitude of capital market orientation is below average, Social
Democrats and Christian Democrats/Conservatives tended to vote against the
directive. In Finland, France, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland and the UK, where mi-
nority shareholders’ rights are indicated to be above average, majorities of center
party members agreed with the corporate governance liberalization issue. Table 1
indicates no significant influence of other control variables.9 To sum up, analysis
shows that the voting behavior of leftists, Greens, Liberals10 and rightist party
members was affected by their ideological affiliation, while Social Democrats,
Christian Democrats and Conservatives voted with respect to their national af-
filiation.
Why did MEPs of the center from countries with less capital-market-oriented
corporate governance regimes tend to oppose a liberal takeover regulation? The
weapons in hostile takeover battles are share prices. Share prices vary with prof-
itability, which is greatly affected by the institutions that regulate company be-
havior in the conflict of goals between company growth and profitability growth.
As mentioned above, German companies tend to be much bigger, but much
lower valued by capital market participants, compared to UK companies. There-
fore the “share price weapon” tends to be more developed in countries with high
levels of capital market orientation. In addition, politicians from organized
economies might be more sensitive to the “breach of trust” problem: organized
economies such as Germany’s rely more than liberal market economies on the
willingness of employees to invest in company-specific skills (Hall/Soskice 2001).
This increases the amount of both implicit and explicit contracts with employees
that might be breached by successful hostile raiders, which might undermine the
preconditions for the comparative advantage of organized economies.
                                                  
9 Because of heterogeneous error variances of the dependent variable, standard errors
might be overestimated, which raises doubt as to the acceptance of the null hypothe-
ses. I thank Andreas Broscheid for pointing this out.
10 The voting of the Liberals is also interesting with respect to the uniformity of their
voting. Research on European party systems has emphasized on the lack of homoge-
neity of the liberal party family and the ELD group in the European Parliament (Hix
2002: 689; Kreppel/Tsebelis 1999: 957; Smith 1988: 16; Steed/Humphreys 1988: 396).
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By using data covering 21 OECD countries, Table 2 shows correlations between
the La Porta et al. index and other institutional variables, which explore further
characteristics of the different country groups. Not surprisingly, transparency and
share dispersion tend to be higher in countries with capital-market-oriented corpo-
rate governance systems. The high correlation between the La Porta et al. index
and the Hall/Gingerich index of overall production regime coordination shows that
countries with less capital-market-oriented production regimes display further
attributes of organized market economies. This index was constructed by using
data on the degrees and levels of wage coordination (Hall/Gingerich 2001),
among other measures. As Table 2 indicates, there is also a high and significant
negative correlation between the shareholder orientation of corporate governance
systems and employment protection. Employment protection tends to be lower
when capital market orientation is high. The protection of different economic
groups has different priorities in different countries, which affects outcomes such
as company size, profitability and share prices. A liberal takeover regulation is
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likely to strengthen capital-market-oriented companies and to push others into a
more capital-market-oriented direction. To conclude the empirical analysis of the
voting behavior of European parties in July 2001, I demonstrate that none of the
variables discussed in this section rule out the explanatory power of ideological
affiliation and the La Porta et al. index (Table 3). By using all nine measures as
independent variables in one regression, there still remains support for the find-
ings of equations 1–3 in Table 1, while none of the four additionally included and
moderately inter-correlated variables acquires a significant result.
As my analysis has shown, two dimensions explain differences in the attitudes of
European parties toward the liberalization of corporate governance: first, the ideological
affiliation of parties on the left-right axis; and, second, national institutional configu-
rations, especially the national interests resulting from the degree of shareholder
orientation of national corporate governance systems, which is highly correlated
with the degree of overall production regime coordination.11 So far, resistance to
the pressures for further European-wide corporate governance liberalization
should be anticipated where leftist parties are strong and where national configu-
rations shape the characteristics of organized economies, such as low degrees of
shareholder orientation, vocational training systems that create company specific
skills, company networks, and high degrees of wage coordination. Laterally re-
versed, liberalization is likely to be pursued where not only current shareholder
orientation is strong, but also where other characteristic features of organized
market economies are absent and where leftist parties are weak.
                                                  
11 This finding fits with Hix’ (2002: 688) distinction between two dimensions of voting
behavior in the European Parliament, one depending on parties, the other depending
on nations.
Table 2 Correlation Matrix: Characteristic Features of Countries with Shareholder
Oriented Corporate Governance Systems
La Porta
et al. index
Transparency Ownership
concentration
Hall /Gingerich
index
Employment
protection
La Porta et al. index – 0.445**
(n=20)
−0.684***
(n=21)
−.743***
(n=19)
−.468**
(n=21)
Transparency – – −0.634***
(n=20)
−0.448*
(n=18)
−0.497**
(n=20)
Ownership
concentration
– – – 0.599**
(n=19)
0.586***
(n=21)
Hall /Gingerich index – – – – 0.731***
(n=19)
Pearsons r. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3 The German Party Paradox
The analysis has shown that there actually is an underlying left-right dimension
to the discussion on corporate governance liberalization. The existence of a sec-
ond, national and cross-pary dimension might lead to a reduced significance of
the first dimension. But it does not explain why national parties might behave
paradoxically in the sense that they change their position on the left-right scale
with another party. In the following section, I will show that the German SPD sup-
ported more corporate governance liberalization than its rightist neighbor in the German
party system, the CDU.
Table 3 Determinants of Voting Behaviora
Variable Prediction Equation
Constant −124.681
(70.772)
Ideological affiliation + 22.743***
(3.354)
La Porta et al. index + 13.388**
(6.904)
Party in national
government
+ 8.853
(9.439)
Country size 2001 + −0.301
(0.223)
GDP growth 1995–2001 + −0.908
(0.873)
Transparency + 0.819
(0.693)
Ownership concentration − 60.103
57.853
Hall /Gingerich index − 0.337
(0.265)
Employment protection − 0.795
(7.602)
N 75
R2 (adj.) 0.550
OLS Regression Results with standard errors in parentheses. Missing values: see
definitions and sources of variables; variables excluded pair-wise. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05. Software: SPSS.
a Dependent variable: Percentages of subgroup members that voted in agreement
with the takeover directive.
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The mid-1980s saw the start of a set of reforms in German stock market and com-
pany regulation (Cioffi 2002; Cioffi/Stephen 2000; Deeg 2001: 26–29; Lütz 2000;
Ziegler 2000), initiated by a discussion on the quality of Germany as a location of
production (Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland). In the first phase, when the under-
development of the national capital market was increasingly seen as a compara-
tive disadvantage, the aim of these reforms was not to change the German corpo-
rate governance system fundamentally, but to add a more active capital market to
the unaltered attributes of the economic system. The quality of reforms changed
in the late 1990s, when the coherence of economic policy seemed to vanish and
interlocking directorates, insider-oriented accounting standards and limited mi-
nority protection turned out to be inconsistent with the political goals of the
“competition state” (Cerny 1997). The reforms of the late 1990s were not harm-
less, minor reforms like the introduction of electronic stock trading in 1989, but
went straight to the heart of the German corporate governance system (Beyer/
Höpner 2003).
I have distinguished three reform complexes. The first complex concerns trans-
parency, management accountability and minority shareholder protection and
was affected by the 1998 Corporate Sector Supervision and Transparency Act
(KonTraG, Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich), by the
1998 Raising of Capital Act (KapAEG, Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz), by the
work of the “Cromme Commission” that developed the Corporate Governance
Codex published in 2001, and by the 2002 Corporate Sector Transparency and
Publicity Act (TransPuG, Gesetz zur Transparenz und Publizität im Unternehmens-
bereich). The second complex concerns the dismantling of interlocking capital,
which was advanced and accelerated by the 2000 change to the Corporate Income
Tax Law (Körperschaftssteuergesetz) that totally abolished the tax on profits from
the sales of large share blocks. The third reform complex is takeover regulation,
which concerns the discussion on the abandoned EU directive and the 2001 Take-
over Law (Gesetz zur Regelung von öffentlichen Angeboten zum Erwerb von Wert-
papieren und Unternehmensübernahmen). What the three corporate governance re-
form complexes have in common is that they were connected, to some extent,
with the creation of a market for corporate control, because the implementation of
the “one share, one vote” rule, the disentanglement process and a reliable take-
over regulation are all preconditions for company control through takeover mar-
kets. Some of the reforms implemented were passed in consensus, while parties
were in conflict over others. Comparison of the corporate governance reforms
shows that, when parties were at variance, the SPD favored market enforcement
more than the CDU, which is inconsistent with the partisan hypothesis and the
expectation that Social Democrats and trade unions prevent firms from develop-
ing tools to close the gap between shareholders and managers (Roe 2001).
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3.1 The KonTraG Reform of 1998
The KonTraG was passed in 1998 and represented the first significant change of
direction in German corporate governance regulation. Beside some limited modi-
fications to supervisory board regulation, risk management and bank ownership
of industrial capital, this capital-market-oriented law legalized share buybacks,
facilitated the introduction of stock options and, above all, abolished unequal
voting rights. As a result, Germany was one of the precursors of the “one share,
one vote” rule in Europe, which was of importance in the 2000 takeover battle
between Vodafone and Mannesmann. In its commentary on the law, the Federal
Ministry of Justice took the historical step of abolishing the stakeholder view of
the firm (which had been written down in the Stock Corporation Act [AktG, Ak-
tiengesetz] of 1937 and approved by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1979) and
of introducing a shareholder-oriented view, stating that it had no alternative but
to introduce this reorientation (see Beyer/Höpner 2003). Another significant de-
velopment in 1998 was the passage of a controversial law that allowed stock cor-
porations to adopt capital-market-oriented accounting standards (IAS or US-
GAAP) instead of the rules of the German Commercial Code (HGB, Handelsgesetz-
buch), thereby effectively deregulating accounting. Corporate governance reform
continued with the 2002 TransPuG, which obliged stock corporations to publish a
yearly statement in order to explain whether or not – and, if not, why – they ac-
cepted the corporate governance codex of the Cromme Commission, in addition
to some further provisions to strengthen the rights of supervisory boards in their
interaction with management boards.
How did the political parties behave in the debates on the KonTraG? The main
driving force behind this corporate governance reform was the smaller CDU coa-
lition partner, the FDP, the German Free Democratic (Liberal) Party. When the
KonTraG was debated in the Bundestag, the FDP speaker Otto Graf Lambsdorff
said that the law was only a partial success for the FDP, and he regretted that the
FDP was not able to push the CDU toward further liberalization in the exhausting
coalition negotiations. Germany, Graf Lambsdorff said, is a rent-seeking society,
and German companies need more pressure exerted from capital markets.12 The
CDU speaker Joachim Gres opposed this, by saying that a change of direction in
German corporate governance was neither intended nor necessary. “Constancy,”
he said, “is important in economic policy. … Please don’t think that the job of
economic policy makers is to permanently introduce new ideas,” and he insisted
that the notion of a “Germany Inc.” built upon quasi-cartels had no equivalence
in reality (ibid.). And Hartmut Schauerte from the CDU insisted that it was pure
                                                  
12 See Otto Graff Lambsdorff in the debate over the KonTraG, minutes of the Bundestag
debate 13/220 from 5 March 1998. The translated quotation that follows below is by
the author, Martin Höpner, as are all other translations in this paper.
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ideology to say one should restrict the power of German banks, as it was politics
that pleased banks to intervene in industrial crises (ibid.).
So far, this is consistent with the partisan hypothesis. The similarity ends, how-
ever, when we turn to Hans-Martin Bury, the corporate governance expert of the
SPD who introduced its own corporate governance reform blueprint (see also
Cioffi 2002). He called the KonTraG a placebo law to appease the demands of the
public without introducing any substantial change, a law to protect managers
and banks. The German corporate sector, Bury argued, suffers from the power of
banks, interlocking directorates, a lack of transparency, and disabled company
control by the capital market, which leads to a lack of innovation. He cited critics
who called these “encrustations” the “sovietization of the German economy” and
demanded a prohibition of industrial stock ownership of banks and more com-
pany control by capital markets (ibid.). Similarly, the SPD expert Eckehard Pick
said that the protection of shareholders and the further development of the capi-
tal market were important goals for the SPD (ibid.). Margarete Wolf, speaking for
the Green Party, concurred, criticized the power of banks and said that the share
market has to be transformed into a market for corporate control (ibid.). And
even a speaker of the post-communist PDS, Uwe-Ernst Heuer, made the criticism
that interlocking capital turns the economic order upside down. More corporate
control by the capital market, he said, would accommodate the ideas of the PDS
on developing democracy, and it would revitalize the economy.13 In this debate,
the CDU turned out to be the only party protecting “Rhenish capitalism” (Albert 1993),
having no other political ally anymore.
The behavior of the parliamentary left was supported by trade unions. They wel-
comed the KonTraG – including the abolition of unequal voting rights –, followed
by the Corporate Governance Codex of the Cromme Commission (in which trade
union representatives were incorporated) and the TransPuG, as well as the
KapAEG that allowed companies to publish IAS and US-GAAP balance sheets in-
stead of using the HGB accounting rules. Trade unions demanded (and still de-
mand) a European directive to make the IAS standards incumbent on all German
companies, not just stock-listed corporations, and also call for laws to enforce the
determinations of the Corporate Governance Codex juristically (see Bolt 2000;
Köstler 2000; Köstler/Müller 2001; Küller 1997; Putzhammer/Köstler 2002;
Scheibe-Lange/Prangenberg 1997; Schmoldt 2002).14
                                                  
13 Ibid. In the 2002 Bundestag debate over the TransPuG, the same PDS speaker argued
that Germany had to catch up with international corporate governance standards.
“There’s much more to do in German corporate governance reform and shareholder
protection. Let’s do it together!” Minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/231 from 19
April 2002.
14 Please note that Roland Köstler, Michael Müller and Arno Prangenberg – unlike Ma-
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3.2 After 1998: Corporate Tax Reform and Takeover Regulation
A manifest explanation for this puzzling constellation might be that there was
simply a government-opposition dynamic in force that made the opposition criti-
cize the (feigned) impotence shown by the government over introducing far-
reaching reforms. It should be noted that the other two important corporate gov-
ernance reforms were passed after the change in government in late 1998, when
CDU and FDP were in opposition and SPD and Green Party were in government;
still, the CDU was most likely to be the party of “German capitalism” (Streeck
1995). As there was a broad consensus over the recommendations of the Cromme
Commission, the 2002 TransPuG was not as much disputed as the 1998 KonTraG
was. Nonetheless, it was the CDU that suggested constancy in corporate govern-
ance regulation. In the Bundestag debate on the TransPuG, the only speaker who
cast some doubts on the current developments was Susanne Tiemann of the CDU
who said that “no matter if we like it or not: shareholder value also concerns
German corporations,” and she advised against accounting reforms that might be
later abolished by EU regulation, as it was risky to jeopardize continuity in corpo-
rate regulation.15
In the late 1980s, an extensive restructuring of the German corporate network be-
gan which picked up speed in the mid-1990s. Between 1996 and 2000, the number
of capital ties between the 100 biggest corporations declined from 169 to 80,16 and
the large financial companies of Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank in particular
moved from the network center to a more peripheral network position. It had
long been discussed how politics could force the dismantling of interlocking
capital, especially industrial capital held by banks. There were two possible op-
tions to choose from. The first was to forbid banks from owning more than five
percent of industrial companies. Critics of this view – though they shared the
view that interlocking capital should be dismantled – insisted that this was only
possible in combination with lower taxes on profits from the sale of share blocks,
which was the second possible course of action. Otherwise, it was argued, a law
against industrial ownership of financial companies would be an expropriation
act.17
                                                                                                                                                 
rie Bolt, Hans-Detlev Küller, Heinz Putzhammer, Ingrid Scheibe-Lange and Huber-
tus Schmoldt – are not trade union officials, but experts who advise trade unions.
15 See Susanne Tiemann in the minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/231 from 19 April
2002.
16 Data source: Monopolkommission.
17 See Otto Graf Lambsdorff in the debate on the KonTraG, minutes of the Bundestag
debate 13/220 from 5 March 1998.
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It was a political surprise for all observers including capital market participants
that the Schröder government opted for the total abolition of this corporate in-
come tax (Körperschaftssteuer) in the context of the 2000 Tax Reduction Act (Steuer-
senkungsgesetz) without hurting banks with any prohibition act. The motivation
for this reform was explicitly to abolish interlocking capital and, as a conse-
quence, to change the corporate governance mechanisms and to create a more ac-
tive market for corporate control. Beside the “systemic” redistribution conse-
quences postulated in this article (i.e. the tax abolition should speed up network
dissolution, which should lead to a growing number of companies exposed to the
market for control, which in turn should increase shareholder orientation by
causing a reorientation in the conflict of aims between company and profitability
growth, which then should redistribute welfare from employees to shareholders),
the abolition of the corporate income tax on profits from share block sales, some-
times called the “Eichel Plan,” had obvious immediate distributional conse-
quences. When the insurance company Allianz sold their 13.6 percentage equity
stake in Hypovereinsbank in 2002 and earned 2 billions of euros as a result, there
was no profit tax raised for this. This “tax gift” for the big financial corporations
led to a massive conflict between political parties, in which the SPD and the
Greens were opposed by the CDU and the PDS, with the FDP caught between the
ideological positions.
In the Bundestag debate over the Tax Reduction Act in May 2000, the opposition
parties criticized the fact that SPD and Greens had redistributed in favor of large
stock companies, while not assisting the small corporations (Mittelstand). CDU,
FDP and PDS members of parliament applauded the CDU speaker Peter Rauen
when he said that he could not believe it when he heard that finance minister
Hans Eichel planned to abolish this tax totally, pointing out that the SPD and
trade union protest would have been enormous if the former CDU-FDP coalition
had introduced this reform.18 The CSU member of parliament Gerda Hasselfeldt
said that the reform lacked any idea of fairness (ibid.), and the popular speaker of
the post-communist PDS, Gregor Gysi, received applause from the CDU and FDP
groups when he said:
Our government is lead by Social Democrats. How can I explain the following to
the citizens? If a baker sells his bread shop, the state wants taxes. If Deutsche Bank
sells share blocks, the Social Democrat government says they don’t want a single
Pfennig as tax. I can’t understand this. What’s social democratic about that? (ibid.)
In this debate, SPD speakers like Lothar Binding were on the defensive when they
explained their political goal to reform the corporate governance system by
                                                  
18 See Peter Rauen in the debate over the Steuersenkungsgesetz, minutes of the Bundes-
tag debate 14/105 from 18 May 2000.
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speeding up network dissolution.19 Edmund Stoiber, who was the conservative
candidate for Chancellor in the 2002 election, used this issue in his election cam-
paign and announced his intention of reintroducing the tax as Chancellor, which
was welcomed by trade union speakers, who said that “it seems like Stoiber
found such ideas in trade union manifestos,” while industrial representatives op-
posed Stoiber and wanted to protect this “good and important innovation” (see
“heute online,” 20.4.2002).
The third important corporate governance reform issue is takeover regulation.
After the failure of the European directive, the Schröder government introduced a
national takeover law in October 2001, which was less liberal than the Commis-
sion’s proposal for two reasons: it allowed the target company’s board to take de-
fensive measures if it had sought the shareholders’ authorization no earlier than
18 months before the bid, and it allowed supervisory boards to legitimize defen-
sive measures (see §33 of the law). However, this law was definitely no “anti-
takeover law” as liberal critics claimed it to be. The law still provides a regular
playground for (friendly or hostile) takeovers, and it should be mentioned that
most other countries provide more privatized companies with “golden shares”
than Germany does. After decades of a virtual absence of hostile takeover at-
tempts, the “hostile” trade of large share blocks is now accepted in Germany,
which includes acceptance by the legislator (see also Cioffi 2002).
The crucial point here is the difference in party attitudes. Differences were
smaller compared to the conflicts over the 1998 KonTraG and the 2000 Tax Re-
duction Act, but they existed and were emphasized. The FDP criticized the take-
over law as not being liberal enough. Rainer Funke from the FDP said in the
Bundestag debate, “the chancellor gave in to the pressures of trade unions and
managers who protect their benefices against international competition” and
called the takeover law provincial,20 which is not surprising, but consistent with
the ideological affiliation hypothesis. Once again, the CDU turned out to be the
defender of Germany Inc. The CDU expert Hartmut Schauerte welcomed the
failure of the European takeover directive and said that it was primarily the CDU
that had criticized the European directive as being too liberal. In addition to this,
he also argued that the German takeover law failed to allow enough defensive
measures to be taken by managers in order to prevent hostile takeovers. The 18-
                                                  
19 Ibid. – In a letter (No. XIV/2002) for the members of the CDU/CSU faction in the
Bundestag, faction chairman Friedrich Merz wrote with respect to the crisis of the
engineering company Babcock: “This is the disentanglement of Germany Inc. – a SPD
type of disentanglement: the jewels are bought by Americans, the rest goes
bankrupt” (online).
20 See Rainer Funke in the debate on the takeover law, minutes of the Bundestag debate
14/192 from 11 October 2001.
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month period allowed for shareholders’ authorization resolutions, he argued,
was too short and should be replaced by a 36-month period. In the negotiations of
the responsible Parliamentary Financial Committee (Finanzausschuss des Deutschen
Bundestages), the CDU also wanted to decrease the 75 percent threshold provided
for the resolutions of the shareholders’ meetings.21 In opposition to this, the SPD
speaker Nina Hauer said that “the shareholders own the corporation and should
have the final say,”22 and Andrea Fischer from the Green Party declared that the
German takeover law might be much more liberal than it appears, as many com-
panies might abandon implementing the ex ante shareholders meetings’ resolu-
tions on defensive measures by management boards.23 Trade unions, by and
large, supported the SPD attitude, as they preferred to allow codetermined su-
pervisory boards to legitimize defensive measures. The PDS decided to abstain
from voting in the Bundestag ballot on the takeover law.
In summary, the attitudes of the German political parties toward the main corpo-
rate governance reforms since the late 1990s – the KonTraG, the KapAEG, the
TransPuG, the abolition of the corporate income tax on profits from the sales of
share blocks, and the Takeover Law – show a distinct pattern that is inconsistent
with the ideological affiliation hypothesis. When differences in party positions oc-
curred, Social Democrats favored more liberalization than the Christian Demo-
crats and were closer to the attitudes of the FDP than the CDU was. The CDU, not
the SPD, turned out to be the party of “Rhenish” capitalism. Taking the distribu-
tional outcomes of corporate governance liberalization into account, this paradox
outcome contradicts the expectations of partisan theory. Are there any explana-
tions for this discrepancy?
4 Where Does the Paradox Come From?
In this section, two explanations for the party paradox will be discussed: The
historical conversion of ideas and the importance of conflicts over managerial
control.
                                                  
21 See Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, Drucksache 14/7477,
14 November 2001.
22 See Nina Hauer in the debate on the takeover law, minutes of the Bundestag debate
14/201 from 15 November 2001.
23 See Andrea Fischer in the debate on the takeover law, minutes of the Bundestag de-
bate 14/192 from 11 October 2001.
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4.1 Historical Conversion of Ideas
I begin this argument by distinguishing two very different leftist views on inter-
locking capital as a main feature of organized capitalism. The first view was ex-
pressed by Lenin (1985/1917) and shared by most German socialists, including
the early Hilferding. In his theory on imperialism, Lenin described German capi-
talism as a mixture between monopoly and competition, mostly driven by inter-
locking capital and interlocking directorates from the large German banks (Lenin
1985/1917: 45–50), which resulted in a concentration of capitalist power to the
detriment of labor. Consequently, the centers of interlocking capital were seen as
natural points of attack in the revolutionary endeavors of socialists and commu-
nists. This line of argumentation was further developed by supporters of the the-
ory of “state monopoly capitalism” (Staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus – Stamo-
kap) that was influential in German leftist movements, including parts of the
SPD, at least until the late 1970s. In the Stamokap view, Lenin’s theory on imperi-
alism resulted in the strategy of building an “anti-monopolistic force” in formal
agreement with other societal movements that disapproved of the entanglement
and monopolization of financial and industrial capital (Esser 1998: 620; Huff-
schmid 1995: 2). A non-monopolistic capitalism was seen as an intermediate stage
on the way toward socialism.
In the 1920s, this view lost ground in the discussions of the trade unions and the
SPD and was replaced by a view that was expressed by socialist theorists like
Naphtali and the late Hilferding. Both, together with other theorists like Sinz-
heimer, were asked by the board of the German trade union organization, the
ADGB (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverband – German General Workers Asso-
ciation), to develop a conception of the trade union’s view on organized capital-
ism and on adequate leftist responses. The outcome was the 1928 book on “eco-
nomic democracy” (Naphtali 1969/1928) that soon dominated the socialist dis-
cussion. Naphtali and his commission argued:
This complete organization of capitalism, this onward development of free com-
petition toward planned production with the aim of a monopolistic market for-
mation is not a democratization process … However, although we do not wish to
camouflage the capitalist character of the new form of organization, we believe
that this development will result in an impulse for the development of economic
democracy, and we believe that this development has already begun.
[emphasis by the author] (Naphtali 1969/1928: 35–36)
They emphasized the interpenetration of the modern economic and political
spheres, in opposition to the Leninist view, and believed that the competition-
impeding organization of capital could be used as a tool to oblige corporations to
act in accordance with societal goals. Consequently, the Naphtali commission re-
jected ideas that trade unions should call for the disentanglement of organized
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capital by the state. This, said the commission, would be a backward, not a for-
ward, move (Naphtali 1969/1928: 37). Hilferding, in line with Naphtali, wrote
that the innovation of organized capitalism was that corporations had ceased to
be the private affair of capitalists, and that this introduced the socialist principle
of planned production into a capitalist economy (Hilferding 1924). Such ideas
were widely accepted by the late Weimar trade union and SPD movements, and
Hilferding presented the new view on organized capitalism at the 1927 SPD party
congress in Kiel, akin to Naphtali who gave his famous speech on economic de-
mocracy at the 1928 German trade union congress in Hamburg.
In order to understand the current trade union and SPD attitude toward inter-
locking, organized capital, it is crucial to conceive that these ideas were driven in
new directions at two historical junctures. The Hilferding-Naphtali view on or-
ganized capitalism did not survive World War II. As to the collaboration of the
center of interlocking capital with the Nazi regime and its important role in war
preparation, the trade unions stopped their opposition to disentanglement. In
their second nation-wide conference with representatives from the different Al-
lied occupied districts in December 1946, the trade unions expressed the view
that “both world wars have shown that the war-enforcing pressure came from the
concentration of capitalist power in monopolies, cartels, trusts and horizontal
economic groups and the malpractice of their power.”24 In his famous speech at
the Munich founding congress of the Federation of German Trade Unions in Oc-
tober 1949, trade union leader Hans Böckler declared, “it must never happen
again that economic agglomerations, transformed into political power, destroy a
democratic constitution, as happened to the Republic of Weimar” (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund 1989/1949: 202). Beside the nationalization of main indus-
tries, the trade unions called for a consistent disentanglement of capital in their
first manifesto (Leminsky/Otto 1974: 248) and, later, fiercely attacked both the
reform of concentration and interlocking capital that happened in the 1950s and
the powerless anti-cartel policy of the Adenauer government. With respect to the
1957 Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkun-
gen), the trade unions organized a mass demonstration in Dortmund in Novem-
ber 1958, voicing the opinion that “the concentration of economic power again
starts to endanger the democratic state.”25 In short, the trade unions had definitely
ceased to favor interlocking capital over separated, competing economic units.
This reorientation was not undisputed. In 1950, galvanized by various draft laws
over competition policy, the trade unions’ attitude was discussed in the monthly
trade union discussion forum “Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte.” Rolf Wagenführ,
in line with the Hilferding-Naphtali approach, argued: “Trade unionists should
                                                  
24 Quote from Weiss-Hartmann/Hecker (1977: 291).
25 Quote from Deppe (1977: 379–380).
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not favor atomization, but organization of markets. But organization implies not
disentanglement but the perpetuation, and even the creation, of interlocking
capital” (Wagenführ 1950). But such expressions were an exception to the rule,
and a majority of trade unionists and Social Democrats developed a strong pref-
erence for anti-cartel competition policy.26 This does not mean that trade unions
and Social Democrats favored liberal market economies in the 1950s. They still
were socialist movements, and their prevailing idea on “economic democracy”
was a mixed economy consisting of a large nationalized economic sector in addi-
tion to a private sector under a strong competition regime without interlocking
capital, supplemented by a sector with public ownership – but not state owner-
ship, rather collective (genossenschaftlich) ownership – including trade union own-
ership (Gemeinwirtschaft). Concentrated and interlocked, “organized,” capital was
no longer a welcome intermediate stage on the way to this goal.
Of course, the story does not end here. The late 1950s witnessed a second reori-
entation, clearly articulated in the November 1959 Godesberg manifesto of the
SPD, when socialism was finally abandoned as the ultimate aim of the Social
Democrats and the nationalization of main industries was no longer a political
goal. Trade unions reproduced the same reorientation in their 1963 Düsseldorf
manifesto. At this point, the still surviving idea of disentanglement lost its social-
ist background, and my argument is that this conversion of ideology led to a liberal at-
titude that was formerly constructed as a part of a socialist idea. In the 1963 Düsseldorf
manifesto, and in all the manifestos that followed, trade unions called for disen-
tanglement, the abolition of concentration-enforcing tax policies and, above all,
the reduction of the power of the banks by state policy (Haferkampp 1966: 10;
Leminsky/Otto 1974: 252). In 1966, a liberal observer concluded, “the manifestos
of the SPD and trade unions have made, if I may say so, significant steps toward
neo-liberal ideas” (Gutowski 1966: 17). The crucial point is not that trade unions
and Social Democrats did away with leftist ideas, but that a conversion of ideas set
in that redefined what it meant to be leftist in the context of an organized economy. Left-
ist thinking took a more liberal direction, and this attitude survived in the SPD,
which claimed in its 1989 Berlin manifesto “in order to repress the power of
banks and insurance companies, we favor the disentanglement of capital ties
between companies” (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 1998: 46).27 This is
                                                  
26 See the statement of the Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte editorial office (1950).
27 As Green parties favor a decentralized economic structure, they also fit into the criti-
que on organized capital. In their first Sindelfinger party manifesto from 1983, they
called for the disintegration of big companies; in their recent Berlin party manifesto,
they express the view that “monopolies and oligopolies can only be abolished if a
strong merger control, a cartel supervision and an effective disentanglement policy
for regional, national, and European markets are in existence. We want a functioning
competition in favor of customers” (Bündnis 90/Grüne 2002: 50).
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the historical reason why the Social Democrats arrived at attitudes like the call to
forbid banks to own more than five percent of industrial companies, which fitted
exactly with calls from such quarters as the neo-liberal Monopoly Commission
(Monopolkommission 1976, 1998) and Free Democrats like Graf Lambsdorff
(1989: 81–82), and why Social Democrats favor more corporate governance liber-
alization than the Christian Democrats.
In the golden years of German organized capitalism, the SPD-FDP government
between 1974 and 1982 also used organized capital as a vehicle to reach common
goals. Banks and insurance companies were often directly forced to invest in in-
dustrial firms, sometimes even in conflict – in order, for example, to prevent
takeovers from oil-producing companies in the 1970s (Mercedes-Benz), to prevent
the disintegration of companies (Gerling) and to prevent bankruptcies (AEG, Holz-
mann) (see examples in Beyer 2002, Streeck/Höpner 2003). Above all, the pro-
tection against hostile takeovers that was mainly arranged by financial corpora-
tions allowed industrial companies to persist in a low profitability – low market
capitalization equilibrium that provided room to maneuver for huge company
growth and diversification strategies, which in turn allowed the German indus-
trial sector to absorb a greater element of the labor force compared to other coun-
tries, despite the fact that the overall labor market participation rate was below
average (Höpner/Jackson 2001). And, of course, the unions were also part of or-
ganized capitalism and profited from its steering capacity. For experts like Shon-
field (1965) and Zysman (1983), the power of German banks was a functional
equivalent to the high degree of state intervention seen in the French system. But,
where political demands were concerned, trade unions and Social Democrats
treated a Hilferding-Naphtali economy as if it was a Lenin-Stamokap economy,
favoring the disorganization of capitalism on the capital side, in combination
with codetermination and strong trade union influence on the labor relations
side.
4.2 The Importance of Conflicts Over Managerial Control
My second argument removes the discussion to the company level. I start theo-
retically by combining two different views on conflicts inside the firm that nor-
mally fail to address each other. While the industrial relations literature empha-
sizes different interests of employers and employees, principal-agent theory
points to different interests of shareholders and insiders. By combining these con-
flict dimensions into one model, we arrive at a triangle, consisting of three inter-
est groups, three conflict lines, and three different coalition lines in which two of
the groups distinguished can form a coalition against the third one (see Figure 3).
I define the conflict constellation in which shareholders oppose managers and
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employees as an insider-outsider conflict, the conflict in which shareholders and
employees build a coalition against managers as a conflict over managerial con-
trol, and the conflict in which employees oppose the two other groups as a class
conflict. This is still a simple conflict model, but it is much more realistic than
both the principal-agent view and the industrial relations view on conflicts inside
firms.
The class conflict view is the one that fits with the left-right dimension. If capital-
market-oriented reforms strengthen the position of employees’ opponents in class
conflicts, trade unions should refuse such reforms. The same holds true for in-
sider-outsider conflicts. But, opposed to this, employees and their works councils
and trade unions turn out to be on the winning side if increased shareholder
power is played out in conflicts over managerial control. By emphasizing class
conflicts and conflicts over managerial control, I argue that the losses in class con-
flicts are – for several reasons – less visible compared to the gains from conflicts over
managerial control, which makes trade unions support capital-market-oriented
corporate governance reforms more than one might possibly expect. While changes in
class constellation “only” result in redistribution, but leave the institutions of co-
determination and central collective agreements intact, changes in the organi-
zation of conflicts over managerial control result in much more visible, institu-
tional change.
The center of class conflict is the distributional conflict. As increased shareholder
protection and, in particular, the emergence of a market for corporate control
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strengthen the power of shareholders, one might expect a process of redistribu-
tion of net value added in firms that adjust to the new pressures by increasing
their shareholder orientation. Beyer and Hassel (2002) found evidence that such a
development is actually in process: in shareholder-oriented German companies,
the share of net value added that employees receive as wages is in decline, while
dividend payments toward shareholders are on the rise. I will come back to this,
but prefer to examine conflicts over managerial control before doing so.
The share of conflicts inside firms that manifest themselves as conflicts over
managerial control is surprisingly high. One of the crucial points in shareholder
value is company transparency, and disclosure conflicts are conflicts over mana-
gerial control. Trade unionists interpret company transparency as a precondition
and a tool for codetermination. Consequently, trade unions call for a European
directive that should abolish German Commercial Code (HGB) accounting. The
only works council I know that opposed international accounting is the Volks-
wagen works council – Volkswagen is codetermined to such an extent that the
works council sees no need to pass more information toward outsiders. Both
TransPuG and KonTraG concerned management accountability in management
board-supervisory board interaction. As the supervisory board and not the man-
agement board is the codetermined institution, every increase in supervisory
board rights is an increase in the degree of codetermination and is, of course,
warmly welcomed by works councils and trade unions. The field of common in-
terests of shareholders and employees turns out to be even larger, when consid-
ering that both shareholders and employees prefer variable to constant manage-
ment payment. In general, German trade unions and works councils distrust
managerial behavior. The managers’ freedom of action in diversification and
company growth also gives them more room to maneuver for prestige invest-
ments. “If shareholder value helps to limit this risk potential, this must be in the
interest of employees,” says one trade union expert (Küller 1997: 529).
Why is redistribution, as compared to this institutional change, less visible? There
are two different ways in which such redistribution could happen. The first pos-
sible way is downward pressure on wages, which would result in enormous op-
position to shareholder value, but which is not the way in which redistribution
normally happens. Rather, redistribution results from a reorientation in the con-
flict of aims between company growth and profitability growth. Beyer and Hassel
(2002) have shown that shareholder-oriented firms increase profitability targets
and halt company growth, which is compatible with rising wages of core employees,
who are not affected by rising employment insecurities. Why may core employ-
ees’ wages rise, while the share of net value added that employees receive is in
decline? Kurdelbusch (2002) has shown that there is a strong empirical connec-
tion between shareholder orientation and the introduction of non-management
variable pay. Consider a shareholder-oriented firm that halts company growth
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and sells less-than-average profitable subunits in order to raise average profit-
ability: when a part of employees’ wages is variable according to company profit-
ability, the number of employees will decrease, while their wages may increase –
which, perversely, creates an incentive for works councils to tolerate such re-
structurings, as works councils tend to be dominated by core employees and not
by employees on the periphery of corporations. Further mechanisms exist that ab-
sorb redistribution conflicts resulting from shareholder orientation, and the most
important one is early retirement, which allows companies to shift the social costs
of restructuring28 toward welfare state institutions (Ebbinghaus 2001; Mares
2000). Unsurprisingly, early retirement is defended by both company and trade
union representatives.
However, redistribution occurs in a way that leaves not only the institution of
central collective agreements intact, but is also compatible with rising wages of
core employees. Different mechanisms, above all variable non-management pay
and early retirement, absorb the destructive power of class conflict inside the firm
and allow both works councils and employers to pass negative externalities on to
society. By contrast, the works councils’ and trade unions’ gains in conflicts over
managerial control are much more visible and result in institutional change. The
importance of conflicts over managerial control is a second reason why trade un-
ions and the SPD as their most associated party favor shareholder-oriented re-
forms. The implicit coalition between shareholders and employees in company
conflicts over managerial control has an obvious analogy in the implicit SPD-FDP
coalition in the Bundestag debates on the KonTraG and on takeover regulation.
5 Conclusion
Do parties matter in corporate governance reform? Why do German Social
Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, al-
though the distributional outcomes of such reforms would expect the converse? I
have discussed these questions by dividing my analysis into three parts. First, I
                                                  
28 Note in addition that not all conflicts over restructurings are insider-outsider
conflicts (in which shareholders force insiders to restructure) or class conflicts (in
which shareholder pressure helps managers to introduce restructurings that they
would have preferred anyway). There are also constellations, as in the Mannesmann
case, where both works councils and shareholders preferred to split up the conglo-
merate, but were opposed by managers who had a preference for a big and powerful
company. In such cases, even conflicts over restructurings are conflicts over manage-
rial control.
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used the crucial vote over the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test
case, since each relevant European party had to decide on the same liberalization
attempt at the same time, and everyone knew that the voting result would be ex-
tremely close. Two variables turned out to be important predictors of European
MEPs’ voting behavior: ideological affiliation – parties actually matter in corpo-
rate governance reform – and class and party cohesive national interests that re-
sult from the fact that the institutionalization of a European-wide market for cor-
porate control would have asymmetric distributional outcomes, not only within
but also between member states. The large parties tended to vote with regard to
this dimension of interests. I used the capital market orientation of national cor-
porate governance regimes as a proxy variable to estimate such nation-based,
party cohesive interest dimension.
In a second step, I focused on the German case and discussed the parties-do-
matter thesis with respect to the main German corporate governance reforms of
the 1990s. The decisive measures were the abolition of unequal voting rights,
company transparency, management accountability, takeover regulation, and
disentanglement policies. I found that German parties behaved “paradoxically”
in the sense that the SPD favored more liberalization and was nearer to the neo-
liberal positions of the FDP, the Monopoly Commission and liberal economists
than the CDU was. In respect of the corporate governance sphere, the CDU, not
the SPD, turned out to be the party of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism.
In the third part of the paper, I offered explanations for the unexpected behavior
shown by the SPD (and, in part, also the trade unions) toward corporate govern-
ance liberalization. The first argument referred to the conversion of leftist ideas in
the course of the 20th century. In the second half of the Weimar Republic, it was
common within the SPD and the trade unions to view organized, entangled
capital as a part of the most developed (and, therefore, favorable) model of capi-
talism. Two watersheds fundamentally changed this view. Because of the collabo-
ration of the capital entanglement center with Hitler and its role in the prepara-
tions for World War II, post-war trade unions and Social Democrats began to fa-
vor a strong anti-cartel policy, combined with a large nationalized and a large
immediate sector (economic democracy – Wirtschaftsdemokratie). When the SPD
(in the 1959 Godesberg manifesto) and the Federation of German Trade Unions
(in the 1963 Düsseldorf manifesto) abandoned the idea of nationalizing core sec-
tors, the preference for disentanglement remained. These reinterpretations of politi-
cal goals introduced a liberal attitude into leftist thinking. Thus, the historical goal of
the German Left was a liberalized corporate governance regime on the one hand,
in combination with a “non-liberal” industrial relations regime with centralized
wage-bargaining institutions, codetermination, and strong unions on the other
hand.
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I focused on the company level to find a further explanation for the preference –
in this case, of trade unions – for corporate governance liberalization. By com-
bining the conflict models of principal-agent literature and industrial relations lit-
erature into one model, I distinguished different types of conflict inside the firm
and found that the conflict type in which works councils and trade unions find
themselves on the winning side of corporate governance liberalization – the “con-
flict over managerial control” – is of relatively high importance. Increased disclo-
sure and increased management accountability with respect to the supervisory
boards result in increasing degrees of employee codetermination. In contrast to
this, different mechanisms absorb the conflict potential of redistribution as a re-
sult of shareholder orientation. As employees on the peripheries of companies
tend to lose from shareholder value strategies, variable parts of wages in the core
units are likely to increase. This kind of redistribution leaves the institution of
central collective agreements intact. Early retirement is another absorption mech-
anism that decreases sensitivity to losses in class conflicts, compared to gains in
conflicts over managerial control.
These findings have important theoretical implications. First, parties do actually
matter in corporate governance reform. As corporate governance is one of the main
sectors that constitute different models of capitalism, parties have to be taken into
account in the discussion on the forces that change the models of capitalism. An-
other, quite different path of party influence on the organizational degree of pro-
duction regimes has been identified by Iversen and Soskice (2002). They argue
that welfare state arrangements, developed by political coalitions that involve
leftist parties, are a precondition for employees’ investments in firm-specific
skills. This argument links party politics, the welfare state, and skill formation
(see also Gourevitch 2002). My analysis shows that a further path of party influ-
ence exists.
Second, as shown for the German case, I have demonstrated that the conventional
wisdom on party behavior in welfare state design should not be generalized to-
ward corporate governance reform, which was one of the most dynamic eco-
nomic policy fields in the 1990s. Here, paradoxically, the SPD is not the party of “poli-
tics against markets.” As the political importance of the corporate governance pol-
icy field increases, traditional political economy models of left party behavior
turn out to be lacking in complexity. The SPD might be the interventionist, mar-
ket-restricting party in questions of labor market policy. But with respect to the
enforcement of share markets and the conflicts between shareholders and man-
agers, the SPD is the market-enforcing party, whereas the CDU is the market-
restricting party, which has obvious implications for the literature on the interac-
tion of parties and markets. Advanced capitalist societies have developed five dif-
ferent markets with different commodities, participants and cycles (Windolf
1994): markets for territorial property, product markets, labor markets, capital
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markets, and markets for corporate control. Accepted theories of party behavior
in a given market like the product market or the labor market need not be gener-
alized toward capital markets and markets for corporate control, as political par-
ties can act in a market-restricting manner in one sphere, while simultaneously
behaving in a market-enforcing manner in another sphere. With regard to corpo-
rate governance, the explanatory power of traditional left-right scales is limited –
or, alternatively, the classification of some of the parties on this axis as it affects
this political issue is incorrect.
Third, my analysis raises doubt about the assumption that one single parameter
can be found that estimates the impact of parties on the organizational degree of
production regimes that not only fits different spheres of the political economy,
but also different countries. The voting behavior of European parties in the cru-
cial vote over the takeover directive in July 2001 has shown that – beside the ex-
istence of a left-right dimension in corporate governance issues – large center
parties tend to rank national interests higher than ideological differences. In ad-
dition, as I have shown for the German case, it is a consequence of historical experi-
ence and of the domestic institutional configuration whether or not corporate governance
liberalization can be accepted as a part of a leftist idea. For example, it is employees’
codetermination of supervisory boards that make trade unions favor more super-
visory board power in its interaction with managements. In the current state of
research, it is an open question whether the described “paradox” party constella-
tion also exists in other countries. Analogies to the German constellation may ex-
ist in Italy, France, and Portugal.
Fourth, the results of my analysis point directly to the problem of institutional com-
plementarity. The theories concerning different national models of capitalism dif-
fer with respect to the degree to which they emphasize the coherent organization
of subsystems of the political economy, such as the skill formation system, the in-
dustrial relations system and the corporate governance system. For supporters of
the idea of an extensive complementarity connecting the subsystems of produc-
tion regimes, the assessment of the described German leftist strategy should be
self-evident: it lacks coherence. This view does not allow one to favor a liberal-
ized corporate governance regime on the one hand and a “non-liberal” industrial
relations regime on the other hand. Such a combination lacks stability, and in the
event of such an institutional setting being designed, it would be likely to under-
mine economic success. Obviously, the German Left does not believe in the exis-
tence of a complementarity that would make a codetermined liberalized produc-
tion regime a contradiction in terms, maybe even an oxymoron, or at best a possi-
ble, but incoherent and therefore unpromising, combination.
However, it is not immediately clear whether the reason for the incompatibility
between the ideas of scientific “models of capitalism” and of German leftist
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movements lies in the misinterpretations of trade unionists and Social Democrats
or of political economists. Some evidence exists for both. There was an obvious
incompatibility in the demands of German trade unionists when they wanted to
force the Deutsche Bank into investing in the construction company Holzmann in
order to save the company from bankruptcy in 1999, while at the same time sup-
porting the idea of forbidding banks to own more than 5 percent of non-financial
companies. It is typical of those of a leftist persuasion to have a strong belief in
progress, since in both the Lenin-Stamokap view and the Naphtali-Hilferding
view it was the most developed version of capitalism that was meant to lead to
socialism. Conservatives, by contrast, typically are sensitive to the fragility of in-
stitutional arrangements (see Hayek 1948). Consequently, in the Bundestag de-
bate on the KonTraG, it was CDU members (and not PDS or FDP members) who
pointed out that corporate governance liberalization might lead to a declining
ability on the part of politics to force banks to make investments in order to reach
common goals.29
On the other hand, there is also empirical support for the German leftist view, as
opposed to the “models of capitalism” view. The possibility of a liberalized cor-
porate governance regime combined with a centralized, strongly unionized in-
dustrial relations regime – with extensive employee codetermination rights – is
empirically proven insofar as precisely this transformation is already in progress in the
large company sector of Germany. In this process of hybrid convergence, codeter-
mination and central collective agreements remain stable, and works councils on
the one hand and shareholder-oriented company policies on the other fit together
better than one might have expected (Höpner 2001, 2003). In keeping with their
political goals, German trade unions and works councils do not see themselves as
losers in the new interplay of elements that were formerly domiciled in different
regime types.
                                                  
29 See Otto Hartmut Schauerte in the debate over the KonTraG, minutes of the Bun-
destag debate 13/220 from 5 March 1998.
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Appendix: Definitions and Sources of Variables
Voting behavior: Percentage of members of European Parliament subgroups
(British Conservatives, Italian Greens etc.) who agreed with the takeover directive
in the crucial vote at 4 July 2001. Own calculation: according to the information
on the EP website, voting behavior and party group affiliation of each member
was identified. As 75 party groups were distinguished, n=75.
Ideological affiliation: Party group affiliation of each subgroup. 1=affiliation
with Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left or affil-
iation with Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance; 2=affiliation with Group
of the Party of European Socialists; 3=affiliation with Group of the European
People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats; 4=affiliation
with the Group of the European Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Party; 5=affil-
iation with the Union for Europe of the Nations Group. As affiliations with the
Group for a Europe of the Nations Group and with the Technical Group of Inde-
pendent Members were not coded into the ideological affiliation variable, n=67.
La Porta et al. index: Country-based summary measure of shareholder protec-
tion. Index adds one when: the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy
votes to the firm; shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the
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General Shareholders’ Meeting; cumulative voting or proportional representation
of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; an oppressed minorities mecha-
nism is in place; the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a share-
holder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less or equal to 10
percent; shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a share-
holders’ vote. Data source: La Porta et al. (2000). As Luxemburg is not coded, n=71.
Party in national government: Dummy variable. 1=Party was member of na-
tional government in July 2001, 0=Party was in national opposition. Source of in-
formation: Fischer Weltalmanach. n=75.
Country size: Number of national residents in 2001 (millions). Data source:
Fischer Weltalmanach. n=75.
GDP growth 1995–2001: Growth of GDP between 1995 and 2001. Own calcula-
tion. Data source: OECD Main Economic Indicators. n=75.
Transparency: Index on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 1990 annual
reports. Data source: La Porta et al. (1998). As Ireland and Luxemburg are not
coded, n=66.
Ownership concentration: Country-based measure, calculated as the median per-
centage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the 10 larg-
est privately owned non-financial firms. Data source: La Porta et al. (1998). As
Luxemburg is not coded, n=71.
Hall/Gingerich index: Index assessing the balance of strategic coordination rela-
tive to market coordination in the political economy, combining data on share-
holder power, dispersion of control, size of stock market, level of wage coordina-
tion, degree of wage coordination, and labor turnover. Data source: Hall and
Gingerich (2001: 46). As Luxemburg and Greece are not coded, n=68.
Employment protection: Country-based index on the degree of protection of tem-
porary employment. Data source: Nicoletti et al. (2000: 84). As Luxemburg and
Greece are not coded, n=68.
